Summary. In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sucient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. We also show that when this condition holds the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the only cost monotonic selection from the core of the economy. Furthermore, it is unambiguous in the sense that the agents are indierent among all the allocations in it.
goods. The ®rst one of them is the core concept as introduced by D. Foley in [2] . The Core requirement guarantees that no coalition of agents will raise any objections to the proposed allocation. The second property is``techno logical monotonicity,'' i.e., if the publicly owned technology gets better, then no agent should suer a loss. Technological monotonicity was introduced by J. Roemer ([8] ) and has been subsequently used to study some solution concepts (see, for example, [4, 5, 9] ). In the context of one public and one private good, it has been shown in [3] that the egalitarian equivalent corre spondence is the only selection from the Core of the economy which is cost monotonic. Furthermore, this correspondence is unambiguous because the agents are indierent among all the egalitarian equivalent allocations.
Due to the interest of this result, it seems very natural to ask whether it can be extended to more general contexts. The purpose of the present work, is to determine when is such an extension possible. Thus, we adopt a setting very similar to the one in [3] , except that we allow for the possibility of more than one public good. Unfortunately, we ®nd that with several public goods, there is an obstruction to the compatibility of the axioms we have mentioned above. More precisely, the main result in section 2 shows that there is a mechanism satisfying Pareto eciency, individual rationality and techno logical monotonicity if and only if the preferences of the agents ful®ll what we call the``equal ordering property''. This property requires that the agents have the same ordinal preferences when the public goods are consumed for free. On the other hand, when such a mechanism exists then: (i) It must pick an egalitarian equivalent allocation; (ii) the latter form a subset of the core; and (iii) all cost monotonic mechanisms are equivalent, i.e., they provide the same utility pro®le to the agents. Thus, if (and only if ) the equal ordering property holds, one recovers the results in [3] in the sense that the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is not only unambiguous but it is the only cost monotonic selection from the Core of the economy.
The equal ordering condition, which is very natural in the context of one public and one private good (as in [3] ), is rather restrictive in general. For example, with quasi linear, strictly increasing preferences in public goods, the equal ordering property is equivalent to the assertion that all the agents have the same ordinal (though not necessarily cardinal) preferences on public goods.
Thus, the main message which stems from the present work is that with several public goods, there are cost monotonic selections from the core only under somewhat stringent restrictions on the preferences of the consumers. Of course, the one public good case is a very relevant one. Hence, the results in [3] are important in that they cover essentially all the cases for which such a selection from the core is possible. Our results also show that the charac terization of the egalitarian equivalent correspondence, in the setting of many public goods, is a question which remains open for future research.
The dierence between just one and several public goods is that, in the ®rst case, everybody likes more of the public good. But, with more than one public good to choose from, dierent agents might dier in their opinions about which one should be given priority over the others creating, thus, an additional source of con¯ict. Under the equal ordering property, these dis crepancies in priority do not arise.
The model
We follow closely the modeling in [3] . The space of public goods is R m , with m ! 1. These are produced at a cost which is ®nanced by the members of the society. Given two vectors of public goods xY z P R m , x ! z (resp. x ) z) means that x i ! z i (resp. x i b z i ) for every i 1Y F F F Y m; the notation x b z indicates that x ! z and x T z.
We consider economies with one private good and, possibly, more than one public good. The technology available to produce the public goods is described by a cost function X 3 R . The technology is jointly owned by all the members of the society and only one bundle of public goods is eventually produced. We assume that the technology exhibits some bounded returns to scale when producing very large bundles of public goods. Of course, this does not preclude having arbitrarily large increasing returns to scale for public goods within some compact set. Here we use the Euclidean norm k y k n k 1 y 2 k q . For the purposes of computing the lim sup we adopt the following convention: Consider the enlarged real line R Ã R fIY Ig and extend the usual ordering on R to R Ã by de®ning I`x`I for any real number x P R. We de®ne k y k ay I whenever y 0.
We let x f1Y F F F Y ng denote the set of agents. Each agent i P x has preferences over public and private goods represented by a utility function u i X Â i 3 R, where i & R is his consumption set of private good. We will write u i yY t i to denote the utility obtained by agent i P x when the bundle y of public goods is implemented and he has to contribute the amount t i towards its ®nancing. In principle, a negative payment is not excluded, meaning that agent i P x receives some compensation from other agents for accepting the bundle y instead of another one he might have preferred to it. By (i) private transfers of money among the agents might be allowed de pending on whether the consumption set of private goods contains some negative number. By (ii) there are no public bads and (iii) shows that the amount of private good which agents are willing to provide for the con sumption of any ®xed bundle of public goods is limited. Note that u i yY t is decreasing in the private good to indicate that t denotes a payment. For convenience, we have normalized u i 0Y 0 0 for each agent i P x . We also see from (ii) and (iii) that, for i 1Y F F F Y n, the mappings u i are non de creasing and satisfy u i 0 0. We let n i 1 i and extend the utility functions of the agents to Â , by u i yY t u i yY t i , with yY t yY t 1 Y F F F Y t n P Â and i P x . The utility pro®le of the agents is the mapping uX Â 3 R n given by uyY t
An economy is a pair uY consisting of an utility pro®le u and a tech nology . From now on, we ®x the set and a pro®le of utilities u satisfying assumptions 2.2. For simplicity, we use the notation instead of uY to denote an economy. An allocation zY t P Â is feasible in the economy for a non empty coalition & x if z iP t i for some t i P i with i P . We simply say that zY t is feasible whenever it is feasible for the grand coalition x .
Given a technology we say that a nonempty coalition & x can im prove upon an allocation zY t if there is another allocation yY s, feasible for , such that u i yY s ! u i zY t for each i P with at least some strict in equality. An allocation zY t is individually rational (resp. in Core()) if no agent can improve upon it (resp. if no coalition can improve it). The set of Pareto optimal allocations, P, consists of those feasible allocations which cannot be improved upon by the grand coalition x .
Given two vectors
We now specify the domain of economies which we will be considering. We want to make sure that there are individually rational allocations in the economies we deal with. For this reason, we let the set i of admissible economies consist of those mappings X 3 R satisfying assumption 2.1 and such that x y x y for any pair of bundles of public goods xY y P .
Observe now that for any P i the set of individually rational and fea sible allocations in that economy is non empty. Indeed, let P i and suppose that for each agent i 1Y F F F Y n, the vector x i Y t i P Â i is a solution to the problem maxfu i zY rX zY r P Â i Y z rg. (The existence of a solution is guaranteed by Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2.) Let x x 1 x 2 Á Á Á x n . Then x n i 1 x i tx. Hence, xY t is feasible for the grand coalition in the economy and every agent i P x is least as well o with xY t as with
De®nition 2.3 A mechanism is a mapping X i 3 Â assigning to every technology P i an allocation, , feasible in the economy .
A mechanism is Pareto ecient if P P for every P i. It is individually rational if is an individually rational allocation in the economy . The mechanism is said to be cost monotonic if, given two cost functions 1 Y 2 P i such that 1 y 2 y for every y P , it assigns allo cations j , for j 1Y 2, such that u 1 ! u 2 .
We address now the main issue: given a ®xed set of agents, are the axioms of cost monotonicity, Pareto eciency and individual rationality compatible? We need to introduce two additional concepts before we can answer this question completely. The ®rst one of them is the equal ordering property.
In other words, the equal ordering property is ful®lled whenever given yY z P , either uyY 0 ! uzY 0 or uzY 0 ! uyY 0. Thus, if a consumer prefers the bundle of public goods z to the bundle y, when both are free, then so do all the other agents. Thus, agents rank the bundles of free public goods in the same way. This property holds trivially in the case of one public good.
Example 2.5 We illustrate this notion in the case of quasilinear utility functions. The utility of each agent i P x is given by u i yY t i y t, where i X 3 R and i y is the utility obtained by agent i P x whenever he enjoys the bundle of public goods y P for free. The equal ordering prop erty is equivalent to the following statement: for each pair of bundles of public goods yY z P , either i y ! i z for every agent i P x or i z ! i y for every agent i P x . Secondly, we introduce the concept of egalitarian equivalence. It was originally proposed by E. A. Pazner and D. Schmeidler ( [7] ) and has been subsequently characterized in [1] and [3] . De®nition 2.6 The set of egalitarian equivalent allocations is de®ned to be EE fxY t P PX there is z P with uxY t uzY 0g X The bundle of public goods z appearing in the de®nition of EE is the reference bundle for the allocation xY t. The set of egalitarian levels, EL consists of those allocations z P for which there is xY t P EE such that uzY 0 uxY t. A mapping X i 3 Â is an egalitarian equivalent mechanism if P EE for every P i.
In the context of one public and one private good, H. Moulin ([3] ) has proved that the egalitarian equivalent mechanism: (i) is the only one which is cost monotonic, individually rational and Pareto ecient; (ii) it is unam biguous in the sense that all the agents are indierent among those alloca tions; and (iii) is a selection from the Core of the economy. It follows that the egalitarian equivalent allocations constitute the only cost monotonic selec tion from the Core. The result stated below makes precise the conditions under which those results extend to the case of many public goods. Theorem 2.7 Let x f1Y F F F Y ng be a set of agents whose pro®le of utilities, u u 1 Y F F F Y u n , satis®es assumption 2.2. Then, (a) There is a cost monotonic, Pareto ecient and individually rational mechanism X i 3 Â if and only if u veri®es the equal ordering property. (b) If the equal ordering property holds then ii & Core for every technology P i (i.e. any egalitarian equivalent mechanism is a cost monotonic selection from the Core). Furthermore, If X i 3 Â is any cost monotonic, Pareto ecient and individually rational mechanism then for every technology P i,
(ii) The map uÁY 0 is constant on EL. In fact, uzY 0 u for any z P EL.
As a consequence, such a mechanism exists only if the agents have exactly the same ordinal preferences when the bundles of public goods are free. This condition, holds clearly for economies with one public good. However, with several types of public goods it limits the existence of individually rational and cost monotonic selections from the set of Pareto optimal allocations. The second part makes explicit that, whenever the equal ordering prop erty holds, we are back in the setting of [3] . That is, the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the only cost monotonic selection from the Core. In ad dition the egalitarian equivalent rule is essentially unique in the sense that all the agents are indierent among the dierent allocations in it.
The following example underlines the diculties associated with the egalitarian equivalent allocations when the number of public goods is greater than one. Firstly, in many cases there is a continuum of egalitarian equiva lent allocations which are not individually rational. Secondly, the ones which are individually rational, also form a continuum of allocations yielding dif ferent, non comparable, utility pro®les to the agents.
Example 2.8 The economy consists of two public goods (so R 2 ) and two consumers with quasi linear preferences in money given by the utility functions u 1 yY t 2 y 1 p 2 y 2 p t and u 2 yY t 2 y 1 p t, where y y 1 Y y 2 P . The cost of producing the bundle y P of public goods is y y 1 y 2 . It is easy to compute (see [3] ) that the set of egalitarian levels is EL fy P X 4 y 1 p 2 y 2 p 5g.
Only a strict subset of the egalitarian equivalent allocations are individ ually rational. The set of utilities given by individually rational egalitarian equivalent allocations is
Hence, not all the egalitarian levels provide individually rational allocations and, furthermore, there are several, non comparable distributions of utilities in the set .
We ®nish this section with some remarks. There is a related literature, in the context of monotonicity with respect to changes in resources ( [6] , [10] ). The conclusion therein is that Pareto optimality and resource monotonicity are incompatible with other normative properties such as individual rationality from equal division or envy free. The egalitarian equivalent solution has also been characterized by Pareto eciency, monotonicity and a certain notion of fairness with respect to some commodity in [1] . These authors also show that the equity axiom cannot be imposed on more than one commodity; thus, their results show the strength of the monotonicity axiom in another setting.
We also mention that one could extend the domain of the mechanism to allow for changes in the number of agents and consider the axiom of pop ulation monotonicity. Roughly speaking, when the number of agents in creases, the cost of ®nancing the optimal bundle of goods is shared among more agents. Thus, population monotonicity requires that by increasing the number of agents everybody should be no worse o than before. It is easy to argue that the axioms of population monotonicity and Pareto optimality imply the Core property and, hence, individual rationality. Therefore, The orem 2.7 also holds when we replace``individual rationality'' with``popu lation monotonicity.'' Finally, under assumptions 2.2 any monotonic selection from the egali tarian equivalent correspondence de®nes a cost monotonic, Pareto ecient (but of course, not individually rational) mechanism. Thus, the axiom of cost monotonicity alone cannot discriminate among the dierent egalitarian equivalent allocations.
Proof of Theorem 2.7
We use the notation x iP x i for a non empty subset x and a vector x P R , with x . The proof of Theorem 2.7 hinges on the following three preliminary lemmas. Lemma 3.1 Let i P x and y P . Then, there is a continuous, non decreasing
Proof Fix k ! 1 and let hX R 3 R be de®ned by hs u i kyY u i sy. Then, hk u i kyY u i ky u i 0Y 0 u i yY 0 and, since u i 0 0, we also have that h0 u i kyY 0 ! u i yY 0. Since h is continuous, there is sk P 0Y k such that hsk u i kyY u i sky u i yY 0. We de®ne d i k u i sky. Note that d i k is uniquely de®ned because u is strictly increasing in the second argument. Also, 0 d i 1 d i k u i ky, since u i is increasing.
In addition, d i is continuous and non decreasing for k ! 1 because it satis®es the equation u i yY 0 u i kyY d i k. Thus, we can extend d i k con tinuously to 0Y 1 by requiring that it vanishes in that interval.
( Lemma 3.2 Let y P R m be a bundle of public goods in the interior of . Then, a technology y P i exists such that uzY t uyY 0 for any zY t P Â which is an individually rational and Pareto ecient allocation in the economy y .
Proof Fix y P R m and for each i P x choose d i as in Lemma 3.1 and let d maxfd 1 Y F F F Y d n g. Given x P , let kx inffk P R X x kyg and de®ne y x 2n maxfdkxY kx 1g. To simplify the notation we will drop the subindex and write to denote y in the proof of the present Lemma. Note that x 0 if x y so yY 0Y F F F Y 0 is feasible in . In addition, x b 0 if kx b 1. We ®rst verify that P i. Note that k x k kx k y k and x ! kx 1 for all x P . Therefore,
One checks easily that kx z maxfkxY kzg, so x z maxfxY zg x z. Hence, P i. Let now zY t zY t 1 Y F F F Y t n P P be an allocation which is individually rational. Denote by t i0 maxft 1 Y F F F Y t n g. Since, 0 z tx we have that
and it follows that, t i0 ! 2dkz ! 2d i0 kz. First, consider the case kz b 1. If d i0 kz b 0, then t i0 b d i0 kz so by Lemma 3.1 we have that u i0 zY t i0 `u i0 zY d i0 kz u i0 kzyY d i0 kz u i0 yY 0. Therefore, zY t cannot be individually rational because agent i 0 would be strictly better o by deviating to the allocation yY 0 which is feasible for him.
Hence, we must have that d i0 kz 0. But then u i0 yY 0 u i0 kzyY 0 ! u i0 zY 0 ! u i0 zY t i0 . By individual rationality, u i0 yY 0 u i0 zY t i0 u i0 zY 0. Hence, t i0 0 and it follows that z 0. But this contradicts that kz b 1.
Therefore, it must be the case that kz 1 and z y. Since t i0 ! 0 we have that u i0 zY t i0 u i0 zY 0 u i0 yY 0. But zY t is individually rational and, hence, u i0 zY t i0 u i0 zY 0 u i0 yY 0. We conclude that t i0 0, so t 0 and then uzY t uyY 0. Hence, by Pareto optimality, uzY t uyY 0. ( It is easy to check that 1 2 P i for any 1 Y 2 P i, where 1 2 y maxf 1 yY 2 yg. Using this remark, one can verify that the same proof that is used in [3] , also applies here to obtain the following result. Proof (i) Choose a technology P i and let xY t. Fix z P R m a bundle of public goods which is strictly positive. We will prove that u uk 0 zY 0 for some k 0 P R .
For each k P R we may apply Lemma 3.2 with y kz to construct kz P i 1 such that u kz ukzY 0. By Lemma 3.3, either u ! ukzY 0 or u ukzY 0 X 3X1 Let k be large enough so that kz ! x. Since 0 x n i 1 t i , there must be some agent, say i 0 P x , such that t i0 ! 0. Therefore, u i0 kzY 0 ! u i0 xY t i0 and hence ukzY 0 ! u. Observe also that, by individual rationality, u0Y 0 u. Let k 0 inffkX u ukzY 0g ! 0. By continuity, u i u i k 0 zY 0, for each i 1Y F F F Y n. Suppose some inequality is strict, say u 1 `u 1 k 0 zY 0. Again, by continuity, there is k H`k 0 close enough to k 0 such that we still have u 1 `u 1 k H zY 0. On the other hand, by the de®nition of in®mum, there must be some other index, say i 2, such that u 2 b u 2 k H zY 0. But this contradicts equation 3.1. Therefore, u uk 0 zY 0 so P EE and (i) follows. Note that we have also shown that EL has a non-empty intersection with every half-line of the form fkzX k P R g with z ) 0.
(ii) Let now z P EL be a strictly positive bundle of public goods. As the argument of the proof of part (i) above shows, one can ®nd k 0 P R such that u uk 0 zY 0. Since z P EL and is feasible, then uzY 0 ! u. But is Pareto optimal, so uzY 0 u. This proves (ii) for bundles of public goods in EL R m . A simple continuity arguments can be used to extend the result to all bundles of public goods in EL.
(iii) Let i P x be an agent, and let yY z P R m be two bundles of public goods. Suppose that u i yY 0 b u i zY 0. Using Lemma 3.2 we construct y , z such that u y uyY 0 and u z uzY 0. By Lemma 3.3, either u y ! u z or u y u z . Therefore, uyY 0 ! uzY 0. Hence, the equal ordering property holds for yY z P R m . By continuity this property also holds for bundles of public goods yY z P .
(
To ®nish we prove the remaining assertions in Theorem 2.7. The equal ordering property is a sucient condition for the existence of cost monotonic mechanisms. This property by itself also guarantees that the egalitarian equivalent allocations are in the Core of the economy.
